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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
I. SUPREME COURT INTERPRETS STATE CONTRACT CLAUSE SIMILARLY
TO THE-FEDERAL CONTRACT CLAUSE IN UPHOLDING ACT CHANGING
SANTEE COOPER'S FISCAL YEAR
In South Carolina Public Service Authority v. Citizens & South-
ern National Bank1 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a
change in the fiscal year of the South Carolina Public Service Author-
ity (Santee Cooper), instituted by Santee Cooper with the Legislature's
approval, did not violate either the state2 or federal3 contract clauses.
4
Thus, the supreme court affirmed its previous interpretation5 of the
state contract clause as identical to the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of the federal contract clause.' Under the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court's view, a substantial impairment of a contractual
provision is constitutional if it is "reasonable and necessary to serve an
important public purpose."' The court also held that Santee Cooper's
change in the calendar year did not violate South Carolina's constitu-
tional provisions relating to passage of special legislation, single subject
matter of legislation, or state and federal provisions concerning equal
protection and due process.'
1. 300 S.C. 142, 386 S.E.2d 775 (1989).
2. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 4.
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.1.
4. 300 S.C. at 169, 386 S.E.2d at 790.
5. See G-H Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 278 S.C. 241, 249, 294 S.E.2d
336, 340 (1982).
6. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978); United States
Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
7. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth., 300 S.C. at 167, 386 S.E.2d at 789 (quoting
United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 26).
8. The state constitutional provision on special legislation, article III, section 34 of
the South Carolina Constitution, prohibits passage of a special law when general law can
be applied. The court held that Santee Cooper had a unique need for a different fiscal
year from other state agencies. A general law, therefore, could not be applied and no
constitutional violation occurred. Id. at 160, 386 S.E.2d at 785-86.
The state constitution provides that legislation must relate to a single subject mat-
ter. S.C. CONST. art. HI, § 17. The court held that no constitutional violation occurred
because the specific provision for fiscal year change, section 31 of Act 658 was related to
the general subject of Act 658, the finances of the state government. South Carolina Pub.
Serv. Auth., 300 S.C. at 163, 386 S.E.2d at 787.
Furthermore, the court held that the fiscal year change did not violate the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution or
1
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Santee Cooper previously operated on a July 1 to June 30 fiscal
year as prescribed by its Bond Resolutions.' Santee Cooper's competi-
tors operated on a calendar fiscal year from January 1 to December 31.
Santee Cooper believed a change in fiscal year was necessary because
of its inability to compare itself with competitors when trying to at-
tract new clients. Different fiscal years made comparison difficult be-
cause electricity use differed greatly from year to year. An identical
fiscal year allowed Santee Cooper a fair comparison, and made them
more competitive.10
The supreme court found as a matter of fact that amending San-
tee Cooper's bond resolutions was impossible because of the large num-
ber of bonds held by unknown parties." Because of the impossibility of
a bondhold amendment, in 1988 the General Assembly, passed Act
658.12 Section 31 of the Act unilaterally authorized Santee Cooper to
adopt the new fiscal year. On January 23, 1989, Santee Cooper adopted
the new fiscal year effective January 1, 1990, and notified the bond-
holders' trustees of the change. The trustees informed Santee Cooper
that the change violated the constitutional and contractual rights of
the bondholders, and constituted a default by Santee Cooper on the
bonds.1
3
Santee Cooper brought a declaratory judgment action and re-
quested that the trial court certify the case as a class action. Santee
Cooper also asked the court to establish the parties' rights, to declare
that the legislation changing the fiscal year did not violate any consti-
tutional or contractual rights of the bondholders, and to declare Santee
Cooper's right to implement the change.1
4
The supreme court reasoned that the bond obligations were pro-
tected by the contract clauses of both the South Carolina Constitution
and United States Constitution.' 5 The court affirmed its view that the
state contract clause is essentially identical to the federal clause, and,
therefore, should be interpreted like the'federal contract clause.' 6 The
article I, section 3 of the South Carolina Constitution. The court held that the unique
classification of Santee Cooper was a rationally related classification because the author-
ity played a unique role among state agencies. Id. at 161, 386 S.E.2d at 786.
Finally, the court held that no substantive due process rights violations occurred.
Because the fiscal year change would only bring about a neutral or positive effect, no due
process violation occurred. Id. at 170, 386 S.E.2d at 791.
9. 300 S.C. at 150, 386 S.E.2d at 780.
10. Id. at 149, 386 S.E.2d at 779-80.
11. Id. at 157, 386 S.E.2d at 784.
12. 1938 S.C. Acts 658.
13. 300 S.C. at 147, 386 S.E.2d at 778-79.
14. Id. at 145, 386 S.E.2d at 777.
15. Id. at 164, 386 S.E.2d at 788.
16. See id. at 168-69, 386 S.E.2d at 790.
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South Carolina Supreme Court adopted the federal standard estab-
lished by the United States Supreme Court in United States Trust Co.
v. New Jersey. The standard is as follows:
The finding of a technical impairment is simply the first step in deter-
mining whether there is an unconstitutional impairment of con-
tract .... [T]he Contract Clause is not an absolute bar to subsequent
modification of the State's own financial obligations. In this context, a
law which impairs contractual obligations may be found constitutional
if it is "reasonable and necessary to serve an important public
purpose."18
The South Carolina Supreme Court viewed the Santee Cooper leg-
islation as a mere technical impairment because it did not adversely
affect the bondholders' contractual rights. Furthermore, the court rea-
soned that since the legislation was permissive, no breach of contract
'had occurred. As for Santee Cooper's implementation of the fiscal year
change by its January 23 resolution, the court again held that because
the bondholders experienced no adverse effects, only a technical im-
pairment had occurred."9
Once the court established that the legislation created only a tech-
nical impairment under the United States Trust standard, the court
held that the legislation was not unconstitutional. 20 Nevertheless, the
court added that "were there an impairment, however, it is reasonable
and necessary to serve an important public purpose."'2' The court here
refers to the increased competitive ability the change provides Santee
Cooper.
The court's last line of reasoning also favored constitutionality but
is problematic. According to the court, because Santee Cooper never
expressly promised to maintain the old fiscal year, but the fiscal year
was simply defined within the bond resolutions, Santee Cooper could
change the fiscal year without breaching the contract. Furthermore, the
court reasoned that the sections of the bond resolution requiring San-
tee Cooper to operate in an efficiept manner necessitated the change.
Consequently, the court reasoned that no breach of contract oc-
curred.22 The court's reasoning would justify a unilateral modification
of any contract term if the modification arguably was necessary to pro-
17. 431 U.S. 1 (1977). The United States Supreme Court elaborated on this federal
standard in Allied Structural Steel v. Sparmaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
18. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth., 300 S.C. at 167, 386 S.E.2d at 789 (quoting
United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977)).
19. Id. at 168, 386 S.E.2d at 790.
20. Id., 386 S.E.2d at 789-90.
21. Id., 386 S.E.2d at 790.
22. Id. at 169, 386 S.E.2d at 790.
1990]
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mote efficiency and no express promise existed to maintain the term's
contractual definition. This precedent is troublesome. The court im-
plies that any provision which a party does not want changed must be
expressly noted. Contracts written using this method would thus be
riddled with repetitive language expressly stating what may and may
not be modified.
The court's holding on the South Carolina contract clause con-
firms its earlier view. In G-H Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Continental
Insurance Co.2 3 the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted the Fourth
Circuit's view in Garris v. Hanover Insurance Co.,24 that the state con-
tract clause should be interpreted identically to the federal clause.25 As
the supreme court noted in G-H Insurance, "legislation [impairing
contracts must be made] upon reasonable conditions and of a character
appropriate to the public purpose justifying its adoption. '26
The Santee Cooper opinion follows other jurisdictions that inter-
pret state contract clauses by the same standard which the United
States Supreme Court has interpreted the federal contract clause. 27
Considering the precedent within the body of South Carolina law and
the minimal impairment of the contract in this case, the decision is
well reasoned.
Weston Adams, III
II. JUDICIAL INQUIRY INTO THE SUBJECTIVE MOTIVATION OF
LEGISLATORS IS AN IMPERMISSIBLE INTRUSION INTO THE LEGISLATIVE
FUNCTION
In South Carolina Education Association v. Campbell28 the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to expand the number of ex-
ceptions to the principle that ourts should not inquire into legislative
motives to determine the constitutionality of facially neutral statutes.
The court held that the district court judge erred when he relied on
23. 278 S.C. 241, 294 S.E.2d 336 (1982).
24. 630 F.2d 1001, 1011 (4th Cir. 1980).
25. G-H Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 278 S.C. 241, 248-49, 294 S.E.2d
336, 340 (1982); see also South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth. v. Summers, 282 S.C. 148, 154-
55, 318 S.E.2d 113, 116 (1984) (measuring the state contract clause by the federal stan-
dard of United States Trust).
26. 278 S.C. at 246, 294 S.E.2d at 339.
27. See, e.g., Board of Comm'rs v. Department of Natural Resources, 496 So. 2d
281 (La. 1986); Van Slooten v. Larsen, 410 Mich. 21, 299 N.W.2d 704 (1980); Neel v.
First Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 207 Mont. 376, 675 P.2d 96 (1984); Minnesota Trust Co.
v. Hatch, 368 N.W.2d 372 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
28. 883 F.2d 1251 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1129 (1990).
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evidence of the subjective motives of individual members of the South
Carolina legislature. Based on the testimony of individual legislators,
the district court ruled that a facially neutral statute actually was in-
tended to impair the First Amendment freedom of speech and freedom
of association rights of the South Carolina Education Association
(SCEA).' 9
The SCEA sued the Secretary of State, the Governor, and the
Comptroller General of South Carolina to regain its ability to collect
membership dues through voluntary payroll deductions. The organiza-
tion did not dispute the state's authority to regulate payroll deductions
of public employees.' 0 The group claimed that the challenged legisla-
tion violated its members First Amendment rights of free speech and
freedom of association. The SCEA's premise was that the legislation
would impair the group's freedom of association by limiting the num-
ber of members it otherwise might attract and that the loss of revenue
from membership dues would impair its ability to represent its mem-
bers.31 The association also claimed that the state had denied it equal
protection of the law because the statute authorized a "similarly situ-
ated" group, the State Employees Association, to collect membership
dues through payroll deductions.
32
In 1979 the Attorney General of South Carolina issued a nonbind-
ing opinion that public bodies could not provide payroll deductions
without specific statutory authority.3 3 At that time the SCEA was one
of many professional and charitable organizations allowed to use pay-
roll deductions for the collection of dues and contributions without
statutory authority. Because the attorney general's opinion was non-
binding, many South Carolina school districts continued to allow pay-
roll deduction of SCEA dues.3"
In response to the attorney general's opinion the SCEA proposed
legislation to authorize its payroll deductions. In 1981 the General As-
sembly passed legislation that authorizes payroll deductions only for
charities, credit unions, and other financial institutions.", In fact the
statutory scheme specifically excludes participation by labor organiza-
tions.' The SCEA claimed that the legislation targeted it for exclusion
29. Id. at 1253.
30. Id. at 1256.
31. Id. at 1256-57.
32. Id. at 1262-63.
33. Id. at 1252-53.
34. Id. at 1254.
35. S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-11-92 (Law. Co-op. 1986).
36. Id. § 8-11-92(A)(4) (excluding groups that qualify as labor organizations under
26 U.S.C. §. 501(c)(5) (1988)).
1990]
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because of the SCEA's speech-related activities.",
The State Employees Association, which also was denied the use
of payroll deductions under the 1981 statute,38 lobbied the General As-
sembly for three years and obtained specific statutory authority to col-
lect membership dues through payroll deductions.3 9 The legislative
grant to the State Employees Association prompted the SCEA suit and
gave rise to the SCEA's equal protection claim that it was entitled to
the same benefits as the similarly situated State Employees
Association.40
The district court determined that the General Assembly's desire
to target the SCEA motivated the adoption of the 1981 legislation.41
Sitting without a jury, the court heard testimony from individual legis-
lators about their personal motives.42 Without an inquiry into legisla-
tive motive the district court could not have found any constitutional
violations. 3 The statute itself is facially neutral. The statute does not
regulate the rights of labor organizations to solicit members or to ex-
press their views. The law simply excludes labor organizations from
participation in the payroll deduction plan."
The district court applied a strict scrutiny analysis to the SCEA's
equal protection claim because it found that the state's action was con-
37. Campbell, 883 F.2d at 1255.
38. Id. at 1263.
39. S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-11-83 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
40. Although the free speech and equal protection claims discussed in this case are
important, they will not be dealt with at length here. The court of appeals' analysis of
these issues does not indicate a significant departure from existing South Carolina law.
Furthermore, because the court primarily focused on the permissibility of judicial in-
quiry into legislative motive, this survey will do the same.
41. South Carolina Educ. Ass'n v. Campbell, 697 F. Supp. 908, 918-20 (D.S.C.
1988), rev'd, 883 F.2d 1251 (4th Cir. 1989).
42. See id.
43. Even if it had been permissible to inquire into the legislature's motive to find
that the General Assembly had targeted the SCEA, the district court may have erred in
finding that the alleged targeting violated the First Amendment. In Arkansas State
Highway Employees Local 1315 v. Kell, 628 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1980) the court of ap-
peals affirmed a district court holding that "even a retaliatory termination of the [pay-
roll] deduction of union dues would not infringe appellees' First Amendment rights, nor
would it constitute an unpermitted discrimination in violation of the equal protection
clause ..... Id. at 1102. The Eighth Circuit relied on Smith v. Arkansas State Highway
Employees, Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463 (1979) in which the Supreme Court held that the
First Amendment does not "impose any affirmative obligation on the government to lis-
ten, to respond, or ... to recognize the association." Id. at 465. From the language in
Smith the Eighth Circuit concluded that "the First Amendment does not impose any
duty on a public employer to affirmatively assist, or even to recognize a union." Kell, 628
F.2d at 1102.
44. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-11-92 (Law. Co-op. 1986).
6
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tent-based.45 Use of strict scrutiny led the court to find that the statute
violated the equal protection clause.
46
On appeal the Fourth Circuit held that the lower court's "exten-
sive reliance on the testimony of individual members of the General
Assembly as to legislative motive [was] an improper intrusion into the
legislative function. . . ." Furthermore, because "a legislature's deci-
sion not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not in-
fringe the right, and thus is not subject to strict scrutiny,"' the statute
did not implicate a fundamental right. The court of appeals, therefore,
applied rational scrutiny and found the statute to be rationally related
to a legitimate state interest and, thus, constitutional. 9
An established principle of constitutional jurisprudence precludes
inquiry into legislative motives to strike down a statute that is clearly
constitutional in the absence of such inquiry.50 In McCray v. United
States51 the United States Supreme Court made it clear that "[t]he
decisions of this court from the beginning lend no support whatever to
the assumption that the judiciary may restrain the exercise of lawful
power on the assumption that a wrongful purpose or motive has caused
the power to be exerted." 2
The primary reason for this policy is that it is difficult for courts
to determine reliably the actual motives of a legislative body. Chief
Justice Earl Warren summarized this difficulty in United States v.
O'Brien:
53
What motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not
necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it.. . .We decline
to void essentially on the ground that it is unwise legislation which
45. See South Carolina Educ. Ass'n, 697 F. Supp. at 917.
46. See South Carolina Educ. Ass'n v. Campbell, 883 F.2d 1251, 1262-63 (4th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1129 (1990).
47. Id. at 1253.
48. Id. at 1256 (citation omitted) (quoting Regan v. Taxation with Representation
of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 549-50 (1983)).
49. Id. at 1263-64. The Fourth Circuit also noted that the district court had failed
to apply the South Carolina rule that "testimony of legislators is not evidence of legisla-
tive intent... ." Id. at 1260. The court of appeals quoted from Tallevast v. Kaminski,
146 S.C. 225, 143 S.E. 796 (1928) in which the South Carolina Supreme Court said, "It is
a settled principle in the interpretation of statutes that ... resort cannot be had to the
opinions of legislators. . . for the purpose of ascertaining the intent of the Legislature."
Id. at 236, 143 S.E. at 799.
50. As early as 1810 the United States Supreme Court recognized the difficulties
inherent in determining legislative motives and refused to consider such evidence. See
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
51. 195 U.S. 27 (1904).
52. Id. at 56.
53. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
1990]
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[the legislature] had the undoubted power to enact and which could
be reenacted in its exact form if the same or another legislator made a
"wiser" speech about it."'
In addition to the consideration of Supreme Court precedent the
Fourth Circuit determined that an inquiry into legislative motivation
"is inimical to the independence of the legislative branch and inconsis-
tent with the constitutional concept of separation of powers."55
Although the rule that precludes inquiry into legislative motive is
firmly established, the Supreme Court has recognized that certain ex-
ceptions exist "in a very limited and well-defined class of cases where
the very nature of the constitutional question requires an inquiry into
legislative purpose."56s The Fourth Circuit acknowledged these excep-
tions in South Carolina Education Association v. Campbell when it
stated that "[m]otive is thus relevant in these cases only insofar as the
Courts have expressly deemed it a substantive element of the test of
constitutionality."s17
The court of appeals noted three established exceptions to the rule
against judicial inquiry into legislative motive.58 First, when a law in-
fringes the rights of a suspect class the Supreme Court has held that it
is not enough simply to show that the legislation has a disproportion-
ate impact on that class. The aggrieved party also must prove a dis-
criminatory intent on the part of the decision makers.5 9 Accordingly, in
such an instance it is not only permissible, but also necessary for
courts to consider legislative motive because "the very nature of the
constitutional question requires an inquiry into legislative purpose.''0
54. Id. at 384. The O'Brien Court distinguished the use of legislative intent to in-
terpret a statute and the use of legislative motive to void a statute. The Court stated:
"When the issue is simply the interpretation of legislation, the Court will look to state-
ments by legislators for guidance as to the purpose of the legislature ..... Id. at 383.
The Court warned, however, that "[i]t is entirely a different matter when we. are asked to
void a statute that is ... constitutional on its face ...... Id. at 384. See also Edwards
v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-37 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Justice Scalia presents a
well-reasoned general discussion on the dangers of judicial inquiry into legislative
motivation.).
55. Campbell, 883 F.2d at 1262.
56. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 383 n.30.
57. 883 F.2d at 1259.
58. Id.
59. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (racial discrimination); see
also Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979) (gender
discrimination).
60. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 n.30 (1968). The Supreme Court
described the need for heightened protection of suspect classes in Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). In Arlington Heights the
Court said, "[I]t is because legislators ... are properly concerned with balancing numer-
ous competing considerations that courts refrain from reviewing the merits of their deci-
[Vol. 42
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Second, the Court has recognized an exception that relates to es-
tablishment of religion cases. In Lemon v. Kurtzman"1 the Court estab-
lished a three-part test to determine whether legislation impermissibly
establishes religion. The first part of the Lemon test requires that "the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose . *.".., Accordingly,
the "substantive element of the test of constitutionality" 3 in an estab-
lishment case will require inquiry into legislative motive.
Finally, the Supreme Court has allowed inquiry into legislative
motive when a content-based statute directly impairs a party's right to
free speech. In Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland"4 the Court
struck down a state sales tax scheme that taxed general interest
magazines but exempted newspapers and religious, professional, trade,
and sports journals because it violated the First Amendment's freedom
of the press guarantee.65 South Carolina Education Association v.
Campbell is distinguishable from Ragland, however, because the pay-
roll deduction statute did not directly impair the SCEA's First Amend-
ment rights based on the content of its speech or publications.
The significance of the Fourth Circuit's decision in this case is that
the court specifically declined to expand the number of exceptions cur-
rently recognized by the Supreme Court." The case did not present a
suspect class, an establishment of religion, or a direct, content-based
impairment of the SCEA's first amendment rights.
Although the Fourth Circuit's conservative approach may be ques-
tioned by some, it is in keeping with the role of appellate courts. The
Supreme Court has established the precedent for deciding legislative
sions.. . But racial discrimination is not just another competing consideration." Id. at
265.
61. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
62. Id. at 612 (citation omitted).
63. South Carolina Educ. Ass'n v. Campbell, 883 F.2d 1251, 1259 (4th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1129 (1990).
64. 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
65. Id. at 227-31. The Court stated, "Our cases clearly establish that a discrimina-
tory tax on the press burdens rights protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 227
(citation omitted). The Court further noted that "the basis on which Arkansas differenti-
ates between magazines is particularly repugnant to First Amendment principles: a mag-
azine's tax status depends entirely on its content." Id. at 229 (emphasis in original).
66. "The challenged legislation in the case at bar is clearly not among the limited
and well defined exceptions to the principle discouraging judicial inquiry into legislative
motive." Campbell, 883 F.2d at 1259. A decision in favor of the SCEA would have been
an expansion of the recognized exceptions and also would have abrogated the well-set-
tled rule that the First Amendment "does not impose any affirmative obligation on the
government .... ." Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, Local 1315, 441 U.S.
463, 465 (1979).
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intent cases. The Fourth Circuit followed that precedent in South Car-
olina Education Association v. Campbell.
Michael V. Hammond
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